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Abstract: The decision “Pula Parking”, rendered by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on March 
9, 2017, deals with the recovery and enforcement of an unpaid debt resulting from the use of a public 
parking space. The main issue of the case is the question whether a Croatian notary, who is authorized 
under Croatian law to issue a writ of execution, qualifies as a “court or tribunal” responsible for “deci-
sions or judgments” within the meaning of Regulation No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters**.  In the past, the ECJ has never addres-
sed this particular issue concerning the interpretation of the Regulation. Consequently, the ruling will 
serve as a landmark decision for future cases.
Keywords: Brussels I bis Regulation, “civil and commercial matters”, term “court”, Croatian pu-
blic notary.
Resumen: La decisión “Estacionamiento de Pula”, presentada por el Tribunal de Justicia de las 
Comunidades Europeas (TJUE) el 9 de marzo de 2017, trata de la recuperación y el cumplimiento de 
una deuda pendiente de pago derivada del uso de un estacionamiento público. La cuestión principal del 
caso es la cuestión de si un notario croata, autorizado por la legislación croata a emitir un mandamiento 
de ejecución, califica como un órgano jurisdiccional responsable de “decisiones o sentencias” en el 
sentido del Reglamento no 1215 / 2012 sobre jurisdicción y reconocimiento y ejecución de resoluciones 
judiciales en materia civil y mercantil **. En el pasado, el TJCE nunca se ha ocupado de esta cuestión 
particular relacionada con la interpretación del Reglamento. En consecuencia, el fallo servirá como una 
decisión histórica para casos futuros.
* European Court of Justice (ECJ) March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193.
** Regulation No 1215/2012 of the Europe Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 2012 L 351, 1.
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Summary: I. The facts of the case and their legal background. II. Preliminary Questions. III. 
The solution of the European Court of Justice. 1. The applicability ratione temporis. 2. The appli-
cation of Article 1 of Regulation No 1215/2012 to publicly owned companies. 3. The application 
of Regulation No 1215/2012 to Croatian public notaries. IV. Review. 1. Admissibility of the second 
preliminary question. 2. Autonomous interpretation of “courts”: a methodical approach. 3. Coheren-
ce in European Private International Law instruments?. V. Conclusion.
I. The facts of the case and their legal background 
1. Pula Parking d.o.o. is a company owned by the town of Pula in Croatia, which has been autho-
rised through an administrative act to collect parking fees for the use of public parking spaces in the city. 
In September 2010, Sven Klaus Tederahn, a German resident at the time, parked his car in one of these 
public parking spaces. However, Mr Tederahn failed to pay both the parking fee and the parking ticket 
issued by Pula Parking within the required time frame. Therefore, Pula Parking lodged an application 
for enforcement with a Croatian public notary in Pula in February 2015. 
2. Article 278 of the Croatian Enforcement Act (CEA) confers jurisdiction on public notaries to 
examine applications of enforcement that are based on “authentic instruments”. Under Croatian law, an 
invoice or extract from accounting records or any other document considered to be official qualifies as 
an “authentic document”.1  Here, Pula Parking referred to extracts of its accounting records which pro-
ved that Mr Tederahn owed approximately 13 euros for using the public parking area in 2010, including 
a late payment fee. These documents constitute “authentic documents” and made a procedure under Ar-
ticle 278 CEA admissible. Therefore, the Croatian notary issued a writ of execution on March 25, 2015. 
3. Because Mr Tederahn lodged an opposition to that writ according to Article 282 (3) CEA, the 
case was transferred to the Municipal Court of Pula on April 21, 2015. Article 282 (3) CEA authorizes 
an appellate procedure and assigns jurisdiction to a court in case of an opposition to a writ based on 
Article 278 CEA.2 In his opposition, Mr Tederahn argued that the Croatian public notary, who issued the 
writ of execution, did not have substantive or territorial jurisdiction because of his habitual residence 
in Germany. This argumentation is supported by Croatian Law: Under the CEA, jurisdiction is given 
to a notary with an office in the territorial area of the residence or registered office of the defendant in 
the enforcement proceedings. Applications for enforcement made before a notary who does not have 
territorial jurisdiction will be dismissed by the court.3
II. Preliminary Questions
4. To settle the issue of territorial jurisdiction of a Croatian notary public, the Municipal Court 
of Pula decided to ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU. The Court raised two 
questions:
The first question concerns the scope of Regulation No 1215/2012 and asks whether the legal 
nature of a party (here the public ownership of the Pula Parking company) has an impact on the applica-
bility of the Regulation as it only applies to “civil and commercial matters” (cf. Art. 1 of the Regulation 
1  See Art. 31 CEA, J. Garašić also speaks of “trustworthy” documents, J. Garašić in Introduction to the Law of Croatia, 
edited by TaTJana Josipović, Wolters Kluwer, The Netherlands, 2014, § 13.03 [B].
2  See the provisions meaning explained in ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 12.
3  ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 11.
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No 1215/2012). The second and more important question deals with the issue whether a Croatian public 
notary falls under the term “court” or “tribunal” within the scope of Regulation No. 1215/2012 which 
applies to “judgments” or “decisions” rendered by “courts or tribunals” (see Article 2 lit. a)).
III. The solution of the European Court of Justice
5. Overall, one can agree with the answers of the European Court of Justice to the questions 
above that will be presented in the following paragraphs. After a brief summary of the main arguments 
(part III), the Court´s reasoning will lead to some general observations about the Court´s methods when 
interpreting Regulation No 1215/2012 (part IV).
1. The applicability ratione temporis
6. Mr Tederahn had pleaded before the ECJ that the Regulation No 1215/2012 was inapplicable ra-
tione temporis because the Republic of Croatia joined the European Union not until July 1, 2013, whereas 
the parking contract had already been formed in 2010. Thus, the judgment of the ECJ starts with a short 
statement on the temporal scope of Regulation No 1215/2012. According to Article 66 (1) the Regulation 
applies to all legal proceedings instituted on or after January 10, 2015. In this case, the enforcement pro-
ceedings before the public notary commenced in February 2015 and were referred to the Pula Municipal 
Court on April 21, 2015. Therefore, the whole enforcement procedure falls under the temporal scope of 
Regulation No 1215/2012. According to the opinion of Advocate General (AG) Bobek and the Court´s final 
decision, the conclusion of the contract has no influence on the temporal applicability of the Regulation. 
Instead, Art. 66 (1) refers to the starting point of the proceedings, and thereby reflects a fundamental princi-
ple of intertemporal civil procedure law.4 Thus, substantive aspects of the case cannot be taken into account.
2. The application of Article 1 of Regulation No 1215/2012 to publicly owned companies
7. With its first question, the Pula Municipal Court raises the issue whether a contract formed 
between a natural person and a publicly owned company can be treated as a “civil or commercial matter” 
within the meaning of Article 1 of Regulation No 1215/2012.
8. As a first step, the Court confirms the principle of continuity as a method of interpretation of 
the (repealed) Regulation No 44/2001 and Regulation No 1215/2012. Both sets of rules use the terms 
civil and commercial matters in their respective Article 1 and, therefore, must be interpreted in a uniform 
way. 5 Next, the Court states that “civil and commercial matters” are an autonomous concept that must 
be interpreted in light of the objectives of the Regulation and the general principles that originate from 
the foundation of the national legal systems.6 
9. Starting from these general premises, the Court then refers to its wide case law on the term of 
“civil and commercial matters”: In the past, the Court had found that the nature of the legal relationship 
between the parties is decisive.7 The decision points to three factors to determine the legal relationship in 
the present case: First of all, one has to determine the different interests pursued in such a relationship. 
The management and maintenance of a public parking space is a task carried out with a public interest. 
4  P.F.SchLoSSer/B.heSS, EU-Zivilprozessrecht, 4th ed., C.H. Beck, Munich, 2015, EuGVVO, Art. 66 para 2; P.mankowkSi 
in: u.magnuS (ed.), European Commentaries on private international law, Brussels Ibis Regulation, Cologne, Otto Schmidt, 
2016, Art. 66 para 4.
5  ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 31.
6  ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 33.
7  ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 34 with references to the previous judgments of 
April 11, 2013, Sapir and Others, 645/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:228, para 34 and September 12, 2013, Sunico and Others, 49/12, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:545, para 35.
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In contrast, the agreement between the parties as well as the enforcement of the claim constitute a purely 
private interest.8 Offering parking spaces for individuals does not require any public authority. The invol-
vement of the public authority in this case is limited to the empowerment of the Pula Parking company 
by the mayor and does not include any authorisation for a compulsory execution. Even if the Court insists 
on its autonomous interpretation, this argumentation resembles the German Interessentheorie (interest 
theory) that is used in German public law to separate public and private actions of public authorities.9
10. In the following, in a second and third step, the Court analyzes the character of the debt 
and the legal consequences resulting from the missing payment of it: Here, the contract neither imposes 
any penalties nor - even more importantly - gives any power of self-enforcement to the Pula Parking 
company. Therefore, the Court concludes that the parking fee has a purely private character and lacks 
any punitive element indicating public influence. Consequently, the facts are covered by Article 1 of 
Regulation No 1215/2012.10
3. The application of Regulation No 1215/2012 to Croatian public notaries
11. The main issue of the case is the question whether a Croatian public notary involved in the 
enforcement proceeding of an “authentic document” falls within the scope of Regulation No 1215/2012.
As a first step, the Court clarifies again that the concept of a “court” within Regulation No 
1215/2012 must be based on an autonomous definition of the term and must take into account the objec-
tives, the overall structure and the origin of the Regulation.11 Considering the fact that the terms “court” 
or “tribunal” are used several times in the Regulation without any definition of the term itself, one can 
only refer to the general provisions in Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Regulation. 
12. In the following, the argumentation of the Court appears to be systematic at first sight:12 
The ECJ states that Article 3 of Regulation No 1215/2012 explicitly includes Swedish and Hungarian 
authorities that are not considered to be part of the judiciary. This indicates that other public authorities 
not mentioned in this Article do not fall within the scope of the Regulation (argumentum e contrario). 
Consequently, the Court rejects a wide interpretation of the term “court” as proposed by the city of Pula 
and the Croatian government.13
Within the systematic analysis, the Court also discusses a functional approach laid down in Ar-
ticle 3 (2) of Regulation No 650/201214: The provision explicitly encompasses not only judicial authori-
ties but any authority exercising judicial functions. However, the ECJ rejects the parallel interpretation 
because Regulation No 1215/2012 does not contain such provisions.15
13. In support of its strictly systematic approach to interpret the term “court” autonomously, the 
ECJ then refers to the “well-established” principles of mutual recognition of judicial and extra-judicial 
decisions in civil matters (cf. Article 67(4) TFEU) that guarantee rapid and simple access to justice in 
the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice.16
The Court believes that the principles of mutual trust and recognition play a fundamental role 
in EU law and will gain more and more importance, especially in the area of European Civil Procedure 
8  ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 35.
9  Similar h.roth, “Vollstreckungsbefehle kroatischer Notare und der Begriff „Gericht“ in der EuGVVO und der EuVTT-
VO“, Praxis des internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2018, 41.
10  ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 36 and 37.
11  ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 42.
12  For a different interpretation see infra part V.
13  ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 41 and 46.
14  Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable 
law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succes-
sion and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession.
15  ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 47 and 48.
16  See para 53 of the cited decision and the recitals 3 and 4 of Regulation No 1215/2012.
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Law.17 At the same time, however, the Court takes on a rather practical perspective towards these aims in 
the content of Regulation No 1215/2012: The application of the principle of mutual trust by courts of the 
Member States requires a simple and a comprehensible way to identify foreign judgments that fall within 
the scope of the Regulation. Nevertheless, this “apparent” simplicity seems to encounter some difficulties 
in cases similar to the present one where the responsible authority has some kind of “split” competence.
14. Moreover, according to the ECJ´s reasoning, the principle of mutual trust in jurisdictional 
decision requires a guaranteed minimum of independence and impartiality as well as compliance with 
the principle of audi alteram partem.18 When applying this analysis to the present case, the Court finds 
that the procedure before a Croatian public notary does not comply with the principle of audi alteram 
partes, due to the absence of any prior notice of the writ of execution to the debtor.19 The Court argues 
that this reasoning is strengthened by the fact that notaries and courts in Croatia are generally part of two 
strictly separated systems.20 
IV. Review
15. The Court´s analysis and response to the first preliminary question on the applicability of 
Regulation No 1215/2012 to a dispute between a natural person and a publicly owned company appears 
to be accurate. The separation of public and private law in cases concerning public authorities forming 
private contracts must be decided on a case-by-case basis. The criteria mentioned in the present case 
safeguard the guidelines the Court has developed in the past to interpret Article 1 of Regulation No 
1215/2012. Because of the multiple possibilities public authorities have to interact with private indivi-
duals, it does not seem beneficial to develop one definite rule. Instead, a variety of precise and feasible 
criteria has the most value for the Member States when interpreting the Regulation.
16. Similarly, one can agree with the result of the second question although its foundation seems 
to be rather insufficient and fragmentary. To explain this point of view in more detail, the following 
section will first analyse the admissibility of the preliminary question - an issue mentioned only briefly 
in the Opinion of the Advocate General Bobek21 but not at all discussed in the judgment. The following 
two paragraphs will then focus on the method of autonomous interpretation used by the Court.
1. Admissibility of the second preliminary question
17. Admissibility under Article 267 TFEU requires relevance of the matter in dispute for the 
pending proceeding of the referring Member State court. Thus, the question must be essential to render 
a decision.22 In the present case, one may doubt the admissibility of the second preliminary question:23 
The moment where, under Croatian law, the notary is forced to transfer the case to the municipal court 
(cf. Art. 282 (3) of the CEA), the case “enters” the judicial system. Every decision taken by the Croa-
tian court, no matter the outcome, will be a decision by a “court” within the meaning of Regulation No 
1215/2012. Unfortunately, the Municipal Court did not explain the reasons leading him to request a pre-
liminary ruling. Nevertheless, one must take into account the following consideration: If the municipal 
court rejects the opposition for lack of jurisdiction, this reasoning will not be justified without examining 
17  ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 51 (with further references).
18  ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 54, 55.
19  ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 58.
20  ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 56.
21  advocate generaL m. BoBek, Opinion of October 27, 2016, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:825.
22  u.magnuS in u.magnuS (ed.), European Commentaries on private international law, Brussels Ibis Regulation, Cologne, 
Otto Schmidt, 2016, Introduction, para 121.
23  advocate generaL m. BoBek, Opinion of October 27, 2016, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:825, as well as 
J.woLBer, “Der Begriff des “Gerichts“ im Europäischen Zivilprozessrecht am Beispiel kroatischer Notare“, Europäische Zeit-
schrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 2017, 680, 683.
Croatian public notaries under EU civil procedure lawLucienne SchLürmann
952Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Octubre 2018), Vol. 10, Nº 2, pp. 947-953
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt - DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2018.4415
whether the Croatian public notary had rightfully determined his territorial jurisdiction. For this analy-
sis, however, it is important to know whether the notary is obligated to apply Regulation No 1215/2012.
18. In view of this reasoning, one must agree with the line of argumentation presented by AG 
Bobek in his opinion:24 For AG Bobeck, Article 267 TFEU includes a large presumption of relevance 
that cannot be completely rebutted in this case; the evaluation of this relevance is incumbent upon the 
Member State courts.25 This cautious attitude towards the evaluation of relevance within the meaning of 
Article 267 TFEU is traditional for the ECJ case law.26 In addition, the present case shows that a broadly 
understood presumption and a lenient position of the Court in case of missing or inadequate explana-
tions concerning the relevance by the referring court may lead to a landmark decision that will simplify 
the application of the EU Private International Law instruments. This outcome seems to be based on 
political desire rather than on legally founded reasons.
2. Autonomous interpretation of “courts”: a methodical approach
19. In addition, the judgment in Pula Parking shows some interesting approaches to the general 
method of reasoning in the ECJ´s latest case-law:
As we have seen above (see supra IV.3.), the Court takes on a rather “systematic” approach 
towards the issues of the case. At first sight, it seems as if the Court explicitly rejects a “functional” 
approach as used in the interpretation of Art. 3 (2) of Regulation No 650/2012.27 The reference to the 
separation of courts and notaries in the Croatian judicial systems points to an “institutional” definition 
of the term “court“.28 However, this approach is not convincing: the core issues for the analysis are the 
similar (or different) tasks and functions as well as the similar (or eventually different) procedures of 
the two authorities, not in their classification within the judicial system. The subsequent reasoning is 
even less persuasive: The approach especially considers detailed characteristics of Member States´ legal 
systems which completely contradicts the widely quoted autonomous interpretation of the European 
Private International Law, a method explicitly outlined by the Court in the beginning of the judgment.29
20. Nevertheless, one can argue that the Court uses a certain kind of “functional” approach in its 
argumentation. As discussed above, the decisive factor is the different procedural settings in a court room 
and before a public notary, especially regarding the rights of the parties. The principle of audi alteram 
partes is a fundamental principle that guarantees an equal process and the independence of the deciding 
authority.30 Therefore, the Croatian courts and notaries seem to differ more with regard to the procedure 
and their judicial competences than to their institutional structure. Consequently, because these differen-
ces originate from different tasks of the authorities and, therefore, from the function they perform in a 
specific legal system, the Court ultimately uses a functional approach to justify its considerations.
21. As a result, the Court’s approach appears to resemble General Advocate Bobek´s proposal 
of a “two-part definition” of the term “court”:31 In a first step, Bobek proposes an institutional definition 
24  advocate generaL m. BoBek, Opinion of October 27, 2016, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:825, para 37, 59 
and 61.
25  advocate generaL m. BoBek, Opinion of October 27, 2016, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:825, para 60.
26  B.w.wegener, in C.caLLieS/m.ruffert (ed.), EUV/AEUV, 5th ed., Munich, C.H.Beck, 2016, Art. 267 para 22 ff.
27  See also h. roth, “Vollstreckungsbefehle kroatischer Notare und der Begriff „Gericht“ in der EuGVVO und der 
EuVTTVO“, Praxis des internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2018, 41, 43; J. woLBer, “Der Begriff des 
“Gerichts“ im Europäischen Zivilprozessrecht am Beispiel kroatischer Notare“, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 
(EuZW) 2017, 680, 683.
28  h. roth, “Vollstreckungsbefehle kroatischer Notare und der Begriff „Gericht“ in der EuGVVO und der EuVTTVO“, 
Praxis des internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2018, 41, 43.
29  See ECJ March 9, 2017, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para 33.
30  This principle is namely based on Article 6 ECHR, cf. h.Linke/w.hau, Internationales Zivilverfahrensrecht, 6th ed., 
Cologne, Otto Schmidt, 2015, chapter 3, para 3.48.
31  Proposing another approach h. roth, “Vollstreckungsbefehle kroatischer Notare und der Begriff „Gericht“ in der EuG-
VVO und der EuVTTVO“, Praxis des internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2018, 41, 43.
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with reference to the judicial structures of the Member States that is then completed, in a second step, by 
a functional definition to correct potential mistakes.32 Therefore, the ECJ´s reasoning seems to be close 
to this approach. However, one must conclude, that unfortunately, the Court uses no clear method or 
sustainable criterion besides the well-known keywords of mutual recognition and trust.33
3. Coherence in European Private International Law instruments?
22. The line of argumentation does not give a clear reason why the Court rejects a functional 
method in the present case, especially since it contradicts the approach used in Regulation No 650/2012. 
One explanation could be the fact that there is a difference between the “isolated” codification of the 
European Civil Procedural Law in Regulation No 1215/2012 and the Regulation No 650/2012 which 
contains both, jurisdiction and conflict of laws provisions. Yet, such a technicality should not be crucial 
for deciding on a method of interpretation of different European Law instruments. Another indication is 
the fact that most of the “contemporary” EU Private International Law instruments contain provisions 
in both areas.34 To conclude, one has to mourn once again a lost opportunity for the ECJ to define the 
term of autonomous interpretation and to clarify the relationship between the numerous procedural ins-
truments in European Private International Law. 
V. Conclusion
23. The decision of the ECJ in the case Pula Parking shows that even several years after its 
implementation, the scope of Regulation No 1215/2012 is still unclear and leaves open many questions. 
Because of the still existing diversity in European legal and judicial systems, one can assume that new 
issues will arise in the future. The diversity of systems conflicts with the numerous instruments and 
methods in European Private International Law that were originally aimed at simplifying and harmo-
nising access to justice in the European Member States. To advance this objective, the European Court 
of Justice must clarify its method of autonomous interpretation and at the same time provide content 
for well-known keywords such as “mutual trust and recognition”. Furthermore, instead of posing as an 
objective, the term mutual trust and recognition should become a real “fundament” of the European area 
of freedom, safety and justice. The ECJ should shift towards a functional approach - potentially inspired 
by the functional method of comparative law - to ensure a coherent interpretation of European Private 
International Law.35
32  advocate generaL m. BoBek, Opinion of October 27, 2016, Pula Parking, 551/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:825, para 83. 
33  J. woLBer, “Der Begriff des “Gerichts“ im Europäischen Zivilprozessrecht am Beispiel kroatischer Notare“, Europäi-
sche Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 2017, 681, 683.
34  See the new Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes and 
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable 
law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the property consequences of registered partnerships enter-
ing into force on 29 January 2019.
35  The functional method of Comparative law was founded by konrad Zweigert and hein kötZ in their Introduction to 
Comparative Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp 28.
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